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ACCOMMODATING SPOUSES: REGULATION B AND
REVISED ARTICLE 3-THE SURETYSHIP LAW
COMPLICATION
Sarah Howard Jenkins*
Congress enacted the Equal Credit Opportunity Act' in 1974
to insure fairness and impartiality in the extension of credit.
Congress found that economic stability and competition among
financial institutions would be enhanced if credit decisions were
made without discrimination on the basis of sex or marital sta-
tus.2 The Act and its implementing regulation, Regulation B,
were designed "to promote the availability of credit for all
creditworthy applicants without regard to... marital status"
and to prohibit practices that discriminate on that basis.3 Lat-
er, the scope of the Act was extended to include other classes of
discrimination such as race, color, religion, national origin, sex,
age, income-if derived from public assistance, or the good faith
exercise of any right under the Act.4 Although the scope of the
Act extends beyond discrimination on the basis of marital sta-
tus, this article is limited in scope to the impact of the Act and
Regulation B on guaranties' by spouses with special emphasis
on spousal guaranties on negotiable instruments.
* Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Arkansas School of Law at
Little Rock. B.A., 1969, Hanover College; MA, 1970, J.D. 1982, University of Ken-
tucky. The author wishes to thank Arthur Murphey, Professor of Law, University of
Arkansas School of Law at Little Rock, for his comments on a prior draft of this arti-
cle and research assistants, Angela Richardson and Rosalyn A. Matlock, for their
assistance.
1. Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974 § 503, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1995).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (1995).
3. Regulation B (Equal Credit Opportunity), 12 C.F.R. § 202.1-202.7 (1994) [here-
inafter Reg. B].
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (1995).
5. Guaranty or its plural form, guaranties, is the noun form and guarantee or
guarantees is the verb form used throughout this article.
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The law governing negotiable instruments in thirty-eight
jurisdictions is Revised Article 36 Former Article 3 is the ap-
plicable law in the thirteen remaining jurisdictions. Revised
Article 3, promulgated by the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute
in 1990, is an attempt to modernize the substance of the Article
and to conform its style to that of the other articles.' Because
Revised Article 3 contains suretyship rules more favorable to
creditors' interests than those of the Restatement of Surety-
ship,' the common law,9 former Article 3,1° and other state
suretyship statutes," creditors may be more inclined in the
future to request guarantors of credit to make their guaranties
on the principal debtor's promissory note rather than in a sep-
arate document. 2 Guarantors or sureties whose undertaking
appears on a negotiable instrument are called accommodation
parties." This article addresses the special implications that
result from the interface of Revised Article 3 and Regulation B
because of actions taken by creditors in complying with the Act.
The Act exempts from liability any act or omission by a creditor
6. U.C.C. COMMITTEE UPDATE 12-13 (June 1995).
7. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE CURRENT PAYMENT METHODS PROJECT PROGRESS
REPORT 4 (ALI 1988); see also D. Fenton Adams, Problems With the 1990 Revision of
Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 15 U. ARK LITTLE ROCK L.J. 665
(1993).
8. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP §§ 13-20 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1992).
9. See generally RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF SECURITY (1941).
10. U.C.C. § 3-606 (1989). See generally Neil B. Cohen & Sarah H. Jenkins, Sure-
tyship Issues Concerning Secured Lenders, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS,
THE EMERGED AND EMERGING NEW UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1993).
11. Only a few states have comprehensive suretyship statutes. See CAL. [CIV.]
CODE §§ 2787-2855 (West 1993 & Supp 1996); IA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 3035-3070
(West 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 22-01-01 to 22-01-21, 22-03-01 to 22-03-15 (1991);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 371-85 (West 1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 56-1-1
to 56-2-17 (1988).
12. See infra notes 77-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of the distinc-
tions between suretyship principles under Revised Article 3 and the Restatement of
Suretyship.
13. INSTRUMENTS SIGNED FOR ACCOMMODATION, U.C.C. § 3-419 (1990):
If an instrument is issued for value given for the benefit of a par-
ty to the instrument ("accommodated party") and another party to the
instrument ("accommodation party") signs the instrument for the purpose
of incurring liability on the instrument without being a direct beneficiary
of the value given for the instrument, the instrument is signed by the
accommodation party "for accommodation."
Id. § 3-419(a).
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if done in good faith in conformity with any official rule, regula-
tion or interpretation by the Federal Reserve Board or autho-
rized official or employee.'4
I. REGULATION B: IMPERMISSIBLE CONDUCT
In the context of a guaranty on a negotiable instrument, two
primary acts create potential liability and problems for credi-
tors: requiring a spouse's signature and failing to release the
guarantor upon renewal. Regulation B prohibits a creditor from
requiring the signature of the spouse of any applicant who
meets the creditor's standards of creditworthiness. 5 If an addi-
tional party's personal liability is necessary to support the ex-
tension of credit, a creditor may, as always, request a cosigner
or guarantor. The creditor may not require the applicant's
spouse to serve as the additional party. The spouse may,
however, voluntarily serve as the additional party.'7 At least
one commentator suggests that such voluntary action should be
well documented in writing."
These prohibitions are inapplicable if the spousal signature is
necessary or reasonably believed by the creditor to be necessary
to enable the creditor to reach property used as a basis for the
extension of unsecured or secured credit. 9 A creditor's reason-
able belief should be supported by a thorough review of statuto-
ry and decisional law or attorney general's opinions. To other-
wise require a spouse's signature violates the Act and gives an
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(e) (1991); Official Staff Interpretations, 12 C.F.R. pt. 202,
supp. I, Introduction, para. 1 (1994).
15. Reg. B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d) (1994).
16. Id. § 202.7(d)(5).
17. United States v. Meadors, 573 F.2d 950 (7th Cir. 1985) (ECOA not implicated
because wife acted voluntarily).
18. See Kevin A. Palmer, ECOA, Regulation B, and the Spousal Guaranty, 110
BANKING L.J. 342, 350 (July-August 1993).
19. Reg. B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(2)(3)(4) (1994); Reg. B, Official Staff Interpreta-
tions; 12 C.F.R. Pt. 202, supp. I, para. 7(d)(4) (1994); see, e.g., Evans v. Centralfed
Mortgage, 815 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1987) (creditor did not violate ECOA by requiring
husband's signature in the warranty deed and deed of trust in community property
state when wife applied for loan to purchase non-residential real property); McKenzie
v. U.S. Home Corp., 704 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1983) (creditor's denial of loan subject to
applicant's divorce becoming final or husband's signing of the deed of trust to insure
valid lien on the property not a violation).
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applicant a right to seek affirmative relief'0 including actual
damages,2  punitive damages,22  and reasonable attorney's
fees."
At first blush, these principles may appear innocuous. The
original narrow definition of "applicant" under former Regula-
tion B excluded non-borrowers such as guarantors and their
spouses and limited the right to seek affirmative relief to the
borrower-applicant, often a corporate entity.' Furthermore, a
married non-corporate borrower who received funds and enjoyed
the benefit of credit was unlikely to complain. Revising Regula-
tion B to increase the regulation's effectiveness in controlling
and motivating creditor compliance, the Federal Reserve Board
expanded the definition of "applicant" and clarified the scope of
those included within the term "creditor."
Any person who requests or receives an extension of credit
from the creditor, including one who is or may become contrac-
tually liable regarding an extension of credit, such as
guarantors, sureties, indorsers, and accommodation parties, is
now an applicant.25 Each of these parties to an extension of
credit, whether commercial26 or consumer, is empowered under
20. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e (1995).
21. Actual damages may include out-of-pocket monetary losses, injury to credit
reputation, mental anguish, humiliation, or embarrassment. Anderson v. United Fin.
Co., 666 F.2d 1274, 1277 (9th Cir. 1982); see, e.g., Bhandari v. First Nat'l Bank, 808
F.2d 1082 (5th Cir. 1987) (applicant awarded $1.35 for postage, $1000 for private,
momentary and personal affront when creditor provided notice of denial of credit that
failed to give a complete list of the reasons for adverse action).
22. Punitive damages are limited to an amount not greater than $10,000 except
in the case of a class action. The total recovery for punitive damages in a class ac-
tion is the lesser of $500,000 or one percent of the creditor's net worth. 15 U.S.C. §
1691e(b) (1995). Punitive damages may be awarded regardless of proof of actual dam-
ages. See Fischl v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 708 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1983);
Shuman v. Standard Oil Co., 453 F. Supp. 1150 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (award of punitive
damages requires a threshold finding of a reckless disregard for the requirements of
the law).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(d) (1995).
24. See, e.g., Comas v. Equibank, No. 80-00288, 1989 WL 69857 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1989) (corporate borrower); Douglas County Natl Bank v. Pfeiff, 809 P.2d 1100 (1991)
(individual borrower for business purposes).
25. Notes or other obligations issued or signed before the effective date of revised
Regulation B are immune from attack by guarantors on the basis of an ECOA viola-
tion. See Mayes v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 37 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 1994); Boatmen's First
Nat'l Bank v. Koger, 784 F. Supp. 815 (D. Kan. 1992); Marine Am. State Bank v.
Lincoln, 433 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1988).
26. The 1985 revisions to Regulation B clarified that the Act and Regulation B
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the Act to seek affirmative relief." The expanded definition
grants standing to all makers, indorsers, guarantors, and their
spouses, greatly increasing the creditor's potential liability and
the Regulation's sting if violated.
Moreover, this liability is not limited to the institution lend-
ing the funds. Any person who influences the credit decision,
whether they are an assignee, subrogee, or potential purchaser
of the instrument or paper, is by definition a creditor.28 Under
the revised Regulation B, the term "creditor" also includes a
person who, in the ordinary course of business, regularly refers
applicants or prospective applicants to creditors or selects or
offers to select creditors to whom requests for credit may be
made.29  Those who make an initial assessment of an
applicant's creditworthiness, set the standards for determining
creditworthiness, or apply a financing institution's standards to
a prospective applicant should also be deemed to be a "creditor"
for the purposes of Regulation B. This broadened scope effec-
tively reaches wrongful conduct at all levels of the credit deci-
sion. However, the wrongful conduct of one "creditor" or arrang-
er in the transaction does not result in the liability of another
"creditor" unless the other knew or had reasonable notice of the
act, policy, or practice that constituted the violation before be-
coming involved in the credit transaction."
Assuming the spousal guaranty is obtained without violating
the statute, upon renewal of the borrower's obligation the credi-
tor must determine whether the additional parties, guarantors
or indorsers, are still warranted. If not, the additional parties
must be released."' At least one court has concluded that the
applied to business credit and the 1989 revisions to Regulation B eliminated prior
exceptions for inquiries relating to marital status and credit reporting in business
credit transactions. Equal Credit Opportunity; Revision of Regulation B; Official Staff
Commentary, 50 Fed. Reg. 48018, 48019 (1985); Equal Credit Opportunity Business
Credit, 54 Fed. Reg. 50482 (Dec. 7, 1989); Official Staff Interpretations, 12 C.F.R.
202, Supp. I, § 202.1, para. 2(g), 2(j) (1994).
27. Official Staff Interpretations, 12 C.F.R. pt. 202, Supp. I, § 202.1, para. 1
(1994).
28. Official Staff Interpretations, 12 C.F.R. pt. 202, Supp. I, § 202.2, para. 2(1)
(1994).
29. 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(1).
30. Id.
31. Official Staff Interpretations, 12 C.F.R. pt. 202, Supp. I, para. 7(d)(5), 13
(1994).
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Regulation imposes an affirmative duty on the creditor to re-
evaluate the need to have a guarantor. 2 Failure to reassess a
borrower's creditworthiness and the need for secondary parties
is a violation of the Act." However, in releasing a guarantor
to comply with the Regulation, the creditor risks, under surety-
ship principles, the possibility of discharging other sureties, if
any, and discharging all obligations on the first instrument. 4
Consequently, the creditor must not only be concerned with
complying with the Regulation but must also consider the ef-
fects of his or her actions under the applicable negotiable in-
strument law including the suretyship principles.
A. Enforcing the Statutory Rights-A Conundrum
The potential penalties under Revised Regulation B provide
the incentive needed to motivate creditor compliance with the
Act. The broadly defined "applicant" and "creditor" terms extend
the scope of the Regulation to achieve increased effectiveness in
minimizing discriminatory conduct. 5 However, the applicable
statute of limitation may render meaningless the relief granted
by the Act. A two-year statute of limitations is applicable to
any claim for affirmative relief"6 unless an agency that has
responsibility for administrative enforcement commences an
enforcement proceeding, or the attorney general commences an
action within the applicable two year period. 7 Then, an appli-
cant may commence a civil action within one year after the
32. Stern v. Espirito Santo Bank, 791 F. Supp. 865 (S.D. Fla. 1992); see also Paul
H. Schieber, Spousal Signatures Revisited (There's Good News and Bad News), 47
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 364 (1993) (because the facts in Stern v. Espirito Santo
Bank did not show that husband's creditworthiness was re-evaluated, the author
argues that the court required the re-evaluation of borrower's creditworthiness upon
renewal).
33. Paul H. Schieber, Attention Lenders: Re-evaluate Spousal Signature Policies
and Procedures, 5 LOY. CONSUMER L. REP. 68 (1993); Stern, 791 F. Supp. at 869
(citing 12 C.F.R. pt. 202, Supp. I, para. 7(d)(5) (Supp. I. 1992).
34. See infra notes 77-91 and accompanying text.
35. See 50 Fed. Reg. 48018, 48019, Official Comments, para. 2 (Nov. 20, 1985).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(f) (1995).
37. United States v. Blake, 751 F. Supp. 951 (W.D. Okla. 1990) (FTCA five-year
limitations period controlling when action based on ECOA violation commenced under
FTCA).
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commencement of either the agency proceeding or the attorney
general's action.38
With the short statutory period, the primary concern for
litigants is the accrual of the action. Courts addressing the
issue have held that the action accrues on the date the creditor
requires the spousal guaranty and not when the spouse is re-
quired to perform. 9 This view of the accrual of the spouse's
cause of action is consistent with the general view that an
action accrues when the wrongful act occurs or when the plain-
tiff can first maintain an action to a successful conclusion be-
cause all of the elements constituting the harm have oc-
curred.'
Consequently, unless the maturity of the obligation is less
than two years or the underlying obligation is accelerated, the
right to assert the violation, affirmatively, may have lapsed for
many spouses before discovery of the right after conferring with
independent legal counsel. Many spouses who are otherwise
entitled to relief may only become aware of such rights when
pursued on his or her guaranty by the creditor after maturity
upon default by the principal debtor. The 1973 amendments to
the Act enlarged the statute of limitations from the previous
one year period, one year being deemed too short for violations
of anti-discrimination legislation, especially where violations
were not readily ascertainable from the face of the contracts.4'
Congress assumed individual rights would be asserted in pri-
vate actions commenced as a result of publicity surrounding
agency actions after the agency developed and investigated the
facts within the two year statutory period.42 Under Congress'
assumption, a private party had, in effect, a three-year statute
of limitations.
38. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(f) (1995).
39. See Farrell v. Bank of New Hampshire, 929 F.2d 871 (1st Cir. 1991); Riggs
Natl Bank v. Webster, 832 F. Supp. 147 (D. Md. 1993). But see Pierce v. Citibank,
856 F. Supp. 1451 (D. Ore. 1994) (applying a discovery rule for commencing of the
statute of limitations when creditor fails to give notice of adverse action--canceling of
credit card-as required by ECOA).
40. Von Schrader v. Board of Comm'rs, 103 P.2d 930 (Okla. 1940).
41. S. Rep. No. 94-589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
42. 1&
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While this rationale does not justify judicial enlargement of
the limitations period to three years, in light of the express
statutory language, when the private action is commenced with-
out the prior agency or attorney general action, the use of equi-
table tolling and estoppel principles are even more appropriate
given Congress' assumption. Historically, statutes of limitations
were subject to waiver, estoppel, or equitable tolling. These
equitable principles should also be recognized in the context of
spousal guaranties. Some of the equitable principles recognized
under Title VII for the filing of charges' for employment dis-
crimination provide a basis of analogy in the context of credit
discrimination. As in the employment discrimination context, for
example, if a spouse is reasonably unaware of facts" that con-
stitute a violation of the Act, a tolling of the statute of limita-
tions should be recognized by the court. Assume a creditor
informs the applicant husband that wife's voluntary guaranty is
necessary. If a husband, for example, requests his wife's vol-
untary guaranty without disclosing to her the creditor's prior
request for her guaranty, the running of the statute should be
tolled until the wife learned or should have learned of the fact
of the creditor's request.
Additionally, if the creditor makes positive misrepresentations
or disguises the facts45 that constitute a violation, an estoppel
to plead the statute of limitations as a defense should be recog-
nized as within the broad equitable powers granted the courts
under the Act.46 If the creditor misrepresents the need for a
spousal signature or offers a discount in points for joint applica-
tions, or deems an application a joint application as a matter of
policy if joint assets are reflected in the application, the creditor
should be estopped from asserting the statutory period until
that time when the applicants are able to determine or gather
facts of the ECOA violation.
43. See generally MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW § 5.73
(1987).
44. See, e.g., Wolfolk v. Rivera, 729 F.2d 1114, 1117 (7th Cir. 1984).
45. See Meyer v. Riegel Prod. Corp., 720 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1983); see also Bailey
v. Glover, 88 U.S. 342 (1874) (statute of limitations tolled until the plaintiff discovers
the cause of action, provided the plaintiff was not negligent and the defendant active-
ly concealed the violation).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(c) (1995).
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Given the short statute of limitations, several guarantors
have sought to raise the ECOA violation defensively or as a
counterclaim in recoupment.47 Asserting the statutory violation
as an illegality defense, the guarantors argue the violation
rendered their obligation on the guaranty void and unenforce-
able." Courts are divided on whether the violation is a per-
missible defense.49
B. Illegality as a Defense to the Guarantor's Liability
In general, a contract whose formation or performance is
illegal is void and unenforceable. 0 Not only is enforcement of
the contract denied but restitution for any benefits conferred
under the contract may also be foreclosed.5 A court, in some
instances, may raise the illegality on its own motion.52 Cur-
rently, courts are divided on whether a violation of the Act may
be asserted as an effective illegality defense to the guarantor's
liability.53 Some rejecting the defense permit the violation to
47. Characterizing an ECOA violation as a compulsory counterclaim may, more
often than not, preserve the guarantor's ability to limit its liability on the obligation.
See Richard J. Wirth & Jonathan B. Alter, Spousal Defenses Based in Equal Credit
Laws, 99 CoM. L.J. 93, 101 (1994). But see, Riggs Nat'l Bank v. Webster, 832 F.
Supp. 147 (D. Md. 1993) (two-year statute of limitations is applicable to an ECOA
violation asserted in recoupment).
48. See Integra Bank v. Freeman, 839 F. Supp. 326 (E.D. Pa. 1993); CMF Vir-
ginia Land v. Brinson, 806 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Va. 1992).
49. See infra note 53.
50. Sirkin v. Fourteenth St. Store, 108 N.Y.S. 830 (App. Div. 1908).
51. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 140. See generally Takeuchi v. Schmuck, 276
P. 345 (Ca. 1929) (restitution of deposit for land purchase in violation of Alien Land
Law denied); Chapman v. Haley, 80 S.W. 190 (Ky. 1904) (restitution denied to partic-
ipant in scheme to purchase counterfeit money). Although restitution is at law, the
action is equitable in nature and the illegality operates as "unclean hands" to prevent
restitution. West Los Angeles Inst. for Cancer Research v. Mayer, 366 F.2d 220 (9th
Cir. 1966) (whether plaintiffs wrongful conduct (unclean hands) bars equitable relief
of rescission must be based upon an examination of all circumstances and a balancing
of relevant factors including the relative strength of the policy infringed by the plain-
tiff); Myers v. Smith, 208 N.W.2d 919 (Iowa 1973) (prayer for specific performance
denied where contract sued on was tainted with scheme to evade the law or bilk
third parties). Edward N. Fadeley, The Clean-Hands Doctrine in Oregon, 37 OR. L.
REV. 160, 186-87 (1958). John W. Wade, Restitution of Benefits Acquired Through
Illegal Transactions, 95 U. PA. L. REV. 261 (1947).
52. Waring v. Lobdell, 387 P.2d 979 (Wash. 1964); Williams v. Burrus, 581 P.2d
164 (Wash. App. 1978).
53. The guaranty was held void and unenforceable in Integra Bank v. Freeman,
839 F. Supp. 326 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Shammas v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, No. Civ. 90-
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
be raised by way of counterclaim in recoupment.' The Act
does not, in express terms, prohibit the enforcement of agree-
ments made in violation of its provisions. Courts rejecting the
illegality defense do so because of the absence of language au-
thorizing this result in the statute.55 This conclusion is con-
trary to persuasive authority on illegal contracts or agreements.
The Restatement of Contracts recognizes that legislation
infrequently provides that a contract made in violation of its
provisions is unenforceable. 6 The conclusion that a term or
agreement is unenforceable must be reached by the court from
its own perception of the need to protect public welfare or its
own perception of the goals of the legislation despite the ab-
sence of explicit language." Factors to be weighed against en-
forcement include: the strength of the policy as manifested by
legislation; the likelihood that a refusal to enforce will further
that policy; the seriousness of any misconduct; the extent to
which the conduct was deliberate; and the directness of the
connection between the misconduct and the term. Conversely,
factors to be weighed in the interest of enforcing the obligation
are: the parties' justified expectations; any forfeiture that re-
sults if enforcement is denied as well as any resulting en-
richment; and, any special public interest in enforcing the term.
In the context of a Regulation B violation, application of the
relevant factors tips the scale in favor of holding the guaranty
1221-N, 1990 WL 354452 (D. Mass. Nov. 9, 1990) (dictum); FDIC v. Allen, No. Civ.
88-361-W, 1988 WL 361044 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 3, 1988); Eure v. Jefferson Natl Bank,
448 S.E.2d 417 (Va. 1994). However, several courts have reached the opposite result.
See CMF Virginia Land v. Brinson, 806 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Va. 1992); Diamond v.
Union Bank & Trust, 776 F. Supp. 542 (N.D. Okla. 1991) (signature on note);
Citibank v. Norkin, No. 12994/92, 1993 WL 590130 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 24, 1993).
54. See CMF Virginia Land v. Brinson, 806 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Va. 1992) (ECOA
violation a compulsory counterclaim entitling the victim to recoupment damages).
When the violation is asserted as a claim in recoupment, courts are divided on
whether the two-year statute of limitations is applicable. A recoupment claim is effec-
tive until the statute of limitations runs on the creditor's cause of action. See Integra
Bank v. Freeman, 839 F. Supp. 326 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Marine Am. State Bank v. Lin-
coln, 433 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1988); FDIC v. Notis, 602 A.2d 1164 (Me. 1992). But see
Riggs NatI Bank v. Webster, 832 F. Supp. 147 (D. Md. 1993) (two-year statute of
limitations is applicable to an ECOA violation asserted in recoupment).
55. Riggs Natl Bank v. Linch, 829 F. Supp. 163 (E.D. Va. 1993); Citibank v.
Norkin, 1993 WL 590130 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 24, 1993).
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 cmt. b (1979).
57. Id. § 179.
396 [Vol. 30:387
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void and unenforceable. The Act and its Regulation represent a
strong public policy against discriminatory conduct or conduct
that minimizes competition among creditors. Refusal to enforce
a guaranty acquired in violation of the Act will implement the
underlying policy concern reflected in the Act and serve as a
disincentive for conduct that violates the Act. Requiring a
spousal guaranty when the applicant meets the creditor's stan-
dards of creditworthiness or needs the credit enhancing pres-
ence of a guarantor is a direct violation of the express terms of
the statute and its regulation. The creditor's conduct is deliber-
ate rather than inadvertent. Furthermore, in the absence of a
voluntary guaranty by the spouse, the creditor's conduct is the
sole cause of the guaranty.
The countervailing considerations do not justify enforcing the
guaranty. Although the spouse reasonably expects to perform
his or her undertaking at the time of the engagement, the
creditor's expectations of such performance is unjustified given
the statute's prohibition. While the creditor may forfeit the
opportunity to enforce a collateral promise of performance, the
guarantor is not enriched. As a guarantor on a negotiable in-
strument, an accommodation party is one who does not receive
a direct benefit from the loan transaction.58 The creditor's for-
feiture on the collateral undertaking is offset by his or her
ability to enforce the borrower's obligation. The creditor's delib-
erate violation of the statutory mandate negates any public
interest in enforcing the guaranty obtained in violation of the
Act. Likewise, refusing to enforce the guaranty gives effect to
the broad equitable and declaratory powers conferred upon the
courts by the Act.
However, while the illegality defense should be available to
the guarantor, the defense should not be extended to the under-
lying obligation of the borrower.59 If the borrower (husband)
suffers actual damages as a result of the violation, recourse is
available under the statute. If actual damages are suffered,
these should be recovered along with attorneys' fees. In the
58. U.C.C. § 3-419(a) (1990).
59. A court may sever or limit the effect of an illegality to a portion of the con-
tract and enforce the balance. See, e.g., Hemmen v. State, 710 P.2d 1001 (Alaska
1985); Brokaw v. Brokaw, 398 N.E.2d 1385 (Ind. App. 1980). But see In re Marilyn v.
Remington, 19 B.R. 718, 721 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1982).
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absence of actual damages, punitive damages and attorneys'
fees should be permitted for the husband if the creditor's con-
duct warrants such a result." In the absence of actual harm
to the borrower, if both the husband and wife are permitted to
assert the illegality defense, the creditor who has extended
value cannot recover on the borrower's contract and cannot
recover in restitution the funds loaned.6' This results in a sub-
stantial forfeiture for the creditor who has given value and the
unjust enrichment of the borrower. Limiting the scope of the
illegality defense balances the equities between the parties,
discourages conduct by creditors that is inconsistent with the
Act's underlying policy concern for the extension of credit with-
out regard to marital status, and does not result in a substan-
tial forfeiture by the creditor.
C. Illegality Defense and Negotiable Instruments
Assuming the engagement of the guaranteeing spouse-the
accommodation party-appears on a negotiable instrument,
recognition of an ECOA violation as an effective illegality de-
fense may result in a real defense, a defense that is effective
against a holder in due course. 2 If under the particular
jurisdiction's law the illegality of a transaction nullifies the ob-
ligation of the obligor, a subsequent purchaser who gives the
wrongdoing creditor value in good faith for the instrument
without notice of the ECOA violation takes subject to the ille-
gality defense if successfully raised.63 Consequently, a creditor
cannot remove the taint of the ECOA violation from the
60. In Marine American State Bank v. Lincoln, 433 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1988), the
wife did not have standing to assert the violation under former Regulation B and the
husband was the aggrieved applicant. No actual damages were established but the
husband recovered $5000 in recoupment in punitive damages and $5000 in attorneys'
fees.
61. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
62. Holder in due course, a phrase coined by JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUM-
MERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 14-1 (3d ed. 1988), places one in the position of
a superplaintiff who takes free of personal defenses but is subject to real defenses.
63. DEFENSES AND CLAIMS IN RECOUPMENT, U.C.C. § 3-305 (1990). Subsection (a)
states that "except as stated in subsection (b), the right to enforce the obligation of a
party to pay an instrument is subject to the following: (1) . .. (ii) duress, lack of
legal capacity, or illegality of the transaction which, under other law, nullifies the
obligation of the obligor. ... ." Id.
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guarantor's engagement by transferring the negotiable paper to
an innocent third party.
Furthermore, principles of jus tertii should limit the availabil-
ity of the defense to other applicants." Section 3-305 prohibits
the obligor on an instrument from asserting against the person
entitled to enforce the instrument a defense of another person
unless the other person is joined in the action and personally
asserts the defense."5 Thus, the borrower-applicant cannot as-
sert the guarantor's illegality defense thereby preventing the
substantial forfeiture that would result if a violation of the Act
as to a spouse was extended to another party in the absence of
actual damages.66
However, the principle of jus tertii is inapplicable to an ac-
commodation party who desires to assert a defense available to
the accommodated party. Excluding the real defenses of dis-
charge in insolvency, infancy, and lack of capacity, Revised
Article 3 expressly authorizes the use of an accommodated
party's defense by the accommodation party. 7 The limited ex-
clusion of the insolvency, infancy, and lack of capacity defenses
is justified by the very nature of the accommodation party's en-
64. See, e.g., Warren Fin., Inc. v. Barnett Bank, 552 So.2d 194 (Fla. 1989);
Thompson v. Wright, 187 S.E. 311 (Ga. Ct. App. 1936).
65. U.C.C. § 3-305(c) (1990):
Except as stated in subsection (d), in an action to enforce the obligation
of a party to pay the instrument, the obligor may not assert against the
person entitled to enforce the instnunent a defense, claim in recoupment,
or claim to the instrument (section 3-306) of another person, but the
other person's claim to the instrument may be asserted by the obligor if
the other person is joined in the action and personally asserts the claim
against the person entitled to enforce the instrument. An obligor is not
obliged to pay the instrument if the person seeking enforcement of the
instrument does not have rights of a holder in due course and the obli-
gor proves that the instrument is a lost or stolen instrument.
Id.
66. See supra note 59 and accompanying text for a discussion on limiting the
scope of the illegality defense.
67. U.C.C. § 3-305(d) (1990):
In an action to enforce the obligation of an accommodation party to pay
an instrument, the accommodation party may assert against the person
entitled to enforce the instrument any defense or claim in recoupment
under subsection (a) that the accommodated party could assert against
the person entitled to enforce the instrument, except the defenses of dis-
charge in insolvency proceedings, infancy, and lack of legal capacity.
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gagement. The goal of the engagement is to protect the person
entitled to enforce the instrument, the creditor or its transferee,
from the risks of the principal obligor's inability or un-
willingness to perform. Permitting the accommodation party to
raise these defenses would render the accommodation party's
engagement valueless."8 The accommodation party assumes the
risk of these real defenses.
However, permitting the accommodation party to raise other
defenses held by the accommodated party prevents devaluation
of the accommodated party's defenses, avoids a multiplicity of
actions, and discourages conduct by creditors that increase the
risk of the accommodated party's non-performance.69 Further-
more, no jus tertii problem results. 0 The accommodated party's
defense is being raised to the duty owed by the accommodated
party.71 The accommodation party's duty is co-extensive with
that of the accommodated party's duty. Consequently, although
the accommodated party may not assert the accommodation
party's rights under the Act, the accommodation party should
be permitted to assert any rights available to the accommodat-
ed party by way of defense or recoupment under the Act or its
regulation.
II. PERMISSIBLE CONDUCT: RENEWAL OF OBLIGATION
Regulation B and the Official Staff Interpretations provide a
safe harbor for creditors who comply in good faith with the
terms of the Interpretations. Compliance negates the possibility
of a violation of the Act. However, two recommended courses of
action, while not violative of the Act, may result in loss or
harm to the creditor's interest under other law. First, the Regu-
68. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 30 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 2,
1993); Neil B. Cohen, Suretyship Principles in the New Article 3: Clarifications and
Substantive Changes, 42 ALA. L. REV. 595, 605 (1991).
69. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 126 cmt. a (1941).
70. See Lewis & Queen v. N.M. Ball Sons, 308 P.2d 713, 722 (Ca. 1957); Gamel
v. Hynds, 125 P. 1115 (Okla. 1912) (stating the general rule ofjns tertii but revers-
ig and remanding for a determination of whether the makers were accommodation
parties and thereby exempt from the rule); RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 117 cmt. d
(1941).
71. See PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD COMMENTARY No. 11, FINAL DRAFT (1994)
(amendment to U.C.C. § 3-605 cmt. 3).
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lation has been interpreted to require the release of guarantors
whose engagements become unnecessary because of a change in
the borrower's creditworthiness. This action creates possible
suretyship defenses that may be raised by remaining sureties.
Second, the Staff Interpretations suggest that a legend may be
used on an integrated document to reflect that a spouse's limit-
ed undertaking is for the purpose of granting an interest in
jointly held property. Of concern for creditors desiring the favor-
able rules of Revised Article 3 is whether such a legend will
render the writing not negotiable.7"
A. Release of Unnecessary Guarantors Upon Renewal
At maturity of the borrower's obligation, the borrower may
seek a renewal of the obligation to postpone payment to some
later definite time. Upon renewal of the borrower's obligation, if
the creditor re-evaluates the borrower's creditworthiness, the
creditor must determine whether additional parties, guarantors
or indorsers, are still warranted and, if not, release the addi-
tional parties.73 The court in Stern v. Espirito Santos Bank of
Florida,' concluded that the Act imposed an affirmative obli-
gation upon the creditor to re-evaluate the need for a guarantor
when the credit obligation was renewed.75 Should the creditor
determine that the borrower's creditworthiness now meets his
or her standards, one or more accommodation parties must be
released. At early common law, such a release or other change,
no matter how slight, in the original obligation among the par-
ties discharged any other party having a right of recourse
against the party released.76 At early common law and under
the Restatement of Security, in the absence of an agreement
72. While parties may by agreement appropriate Article 3 rules to govern their
transaction and any transferee who takes with notice of these contract terms, a writ-
ing that fails to meet the requirements of negotiability cannot by agreement be
deemed negotiable. U.C.C. § 3-104 cmt. 2 (1990).
73. Official Staff Interpretations, 12 C.F.R. pt. 202, Supp. I, para. 7(d)(5), 3
(1994).
74. 791 F. Supp. 865 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
75. See Schieber, supra note 32. Because the facts did not show that the
husband's creditworthiness was re-evaluated, the author argues that the court re-
quires the re-evaluation of the borrower's creditworthiness upon renewal. Id. at 365.
76. See generally William H. Loyd, The Surety, 66 U. PA. L. REV. 40, 53 (1917).
77. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 146 (1941).
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or unequal equities that establish a subsuretyship relationship,
multiple sureties for the same obligation were deemed to be co-
sureties, sharing the loss caused by the default of the principal
debtor and had a right of contribution among themselves. 8
Thus, if the multiple sureties were co-sureties and one was re-
leased, the remaining surety would have had a right of recourse
against the one discharged and would, therefore, be discharged
from its obligation. 9
A subsuretyship relationship exists between multiple sureties
if they agree that as between themselves, one rather than the
other should perform or bear the cost of performance." If the
relationship was one of subsuretyship and the surety with the
obligation of performance (principal surety) was released, the
remaining surety (subsurety), having a right of reimbursement
from the released surety, would be discharged. However, if the
subsurety was released, the principal surety would not be dis-
charged because the principal surety would not have a right of
recourse against the subsurety.
Revised Article 3 and former Article 3 vary this outcome at
early common law but in substantially different ways. For obli-
gations of guarantors appearing in a guaranty separate from
the negotiable instrument, the Restatement of Suretyship ap-
proach is also distinguishable. A creditor releasing an accommo-
dation party upon renewal of the obligation in a jurisdiction
that has not adopted Revised Article 3 must expressly reserve
his or her rights against any remaining accommodation parties
or obtain their consent to the release to prevent the discharge
of remaining accommodation parties to the extent of the release
granted by the creditor.8' The express reservation preserves
the creditor's rights against remaining accommodation parties
and the remaining accommodation parties' rights against the re-
leased accommodation party.82
78. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 144 (1941).
79. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY §§ 122, 135, & 145 cmt. c (1941).
80. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 145 (1941); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP
§ 47 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1994).
81. U.C.C. § 3-606(i)(a) (1989).
82. Id.
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Similarly, under the Restatement of Suretyship,83 without
preservation of rights by language or circumstances, a creditor
discharges a secondary obligor (surety) to the extent of loss
suffered by the secondary obligor upon release of any other
secondary obligor rather than the extent of release as permitted
under former Article 3. This is an important substantive change
for professional sureties given the allocation of the burden of
persuasion under the Restatement of Suretyship." Professional
secondary obligors (sureties) are allocated the burden of persua-
sion as to the amount of loss incurred from the creditor's re-
lease of any party against whom the secondary obligor (surety)
had a right of recourse."
Under Revised Article 3, release of an obligation of any party
to the instrument does not discharge the obligation of any party
having a right of recourse against the released party. 6 The
comments to Revised Article 3 initially abrogated the doctrine
of reservation of rights," but under the amended commentary
the reservation of rights happens "automatically."88 Further-
more, the revised article does not impose an obligation of ob-
taining the consent of the other accommodation parties. Conse-
quently, creditors in jurisdictions that have adopted Revised
Article 3 are afforded the greatest ease in complying with their
duty to release unnecessary guarantors upon renewal, without
apprehension of inadvertently discharging another accommoda-
tion party. To illustrate, consider the following facts:
John and Ron are shareholders of Corporation, a newly
formed business entity. Corporation desires loan funds to
obtain a necessary piece of equipment. Lender agrees to
make the loan if John and Ron will sign the note as accom-
modation makers along with two additional accommodation
parties. Mary, John's wife, and Paula, Ron's wife, both
83. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 35 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1993, as
modified by Council Draft No. 4, 1994); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURmETYsmI § 48
(Tentative Draft No. 3, 1994).
84. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 43 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1993).
85. Id.
86. U.C.C. § 3-605 (1990).
87. U.C.C. § 3-605 cmt. 3 (1990). But see, PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD
COMmENTARY No. 11.
88. U.C.C. § 3-605(b) cmt. 3 (1990); PERIANENT EDITORIAL BOARD COMMENTARY
No. 11, FINAL DRAFT amendment to U.C.C. § 3-605 cmt. 3 (1994); Cohen & Jenkins,
supra note 10.
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voluntarily agree to serve as accommodation makers. Six
months later, Corporation's successes are less than predict-
ed. Lender, aware of the Corporation's poor cash position,
its continued sluggish revenues, and unlikely short term
turnaround, agrees with John and Ron not to exercise its
rights under the note to accelerate payment for the pres-
ence of an additional accommodation party. Ron's long time
golfing partner and successful surgeon, Stanley, signs as an
accommodation indorser. At maturity, the Corporation de-
sires to renew the note. Corporation's cash position and
revenues have improved. Under Lender's standards of
creditworthiness, Mary's and Paula's engagements are un-
necessary given Stanley's engagement. Attempting to com-
ply with the Act, Lender releases both Mary and Paula.
Under Section 3-116 of Revised Article 3, Ron, John, Mary,
and Paula are parties with the same liability if the drafters
intended in using the phrase "same liability" to limit the con-
cept to the type of engagement made. "Same liability" might
reasonably include consideration of the facts and circumstances
existing at the time an engagement is made in order to distin-
guish co-sureties and subsureties.89 If a broader definition is
intended, "same liability" entails more than the kind of engage-
ment made. Assuming the drafters intended the more limited
scope of "same liability," Ron, John, Mary, and Paula have a
right of contribution from one another and are deemed co-
sureties. 0 Stanley, however, does not have the "same liability"
since he has signed as an indorser. Consequently, as an indors-
er, Stanley has a right of recourse against Mary and Paula for
indemnification.9 Under the Restatement of Suretyship, Stan-
ley would be deemed to be a subsurety even if he had signed as
an accommodation maker given the timing of his engagement,
the relationship among the four other accommodation parties,
Stanley's knowledge of the wives' prior engagements, and his
reasonable belief that as between himself and the other accom-
modation makers, they rather than he ought to pay.92 Howev-
89. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYsHIP § 47 cmts. g-h (Tentative Draft No. 3,
1994).
90. U.C.C. § 3-116 cmt. 1 (1990).
91. U.C.C. §§ 3-412, 3-419(b) (1990).
92. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYsHIP § 47 cmts. g-h (Tentative Draft No. 3,
1994).
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er, if Revised Article 3 is the applicable body of law, Stanley is
not discharged by the release of the wives from their obligation
to pay, even if he suffers loss as a result of the release.
Under former Article 3, Stanley, Ron, and John are dis-
charged to the extent of the release and under the Restatement
of Suretyship, they are discharged to the extent of loss suffered
by Mary's and Paula's release unless, under both provisions, the
remaining accommodation parties consented to the releases or
Lender preserved its rights against the two women.
B. Renewal and the Underlying Obligation
At maturity, if the obligation is renewed and one or more
guarantors are released, are the obligations of all parties to the
first instrument discharged, especially those who were parties
to the first instrument who are not also parties to the second?
In the absence of an agreement on the effect of the second in-
strument, the obligations represented in the first note are sus-
pended and are not discharged. 3 The agreement among the
parties is determined by all the facts and circumstances94 such
as whether the creditor knows that one party is unwilling to re-
new the obligation; fraudulent conduct by a party inducing the
surrender of the original note; the creditor's handling of the
first note-was the note marked "paid," torn, or destroyed with
the intent to discharge the obligations therein; or was the first
instrument surrendered.95 If the creditor re-evaluates and de-
93. U.C.C. § 3-310(b) (1990).
94. DISCHARGE AND EFFECT OF DISCHARGE, U.C.C. § 3-601(a) (1990). ("The obliga-
tion of a party to pay the instrument is discharged as stated in this Article or by an
act or agreement with the party which would discharge an obligation to pay money
under a simple contract.") (emphasis added). DISCHARGE BY CANCELLATION OR RENUN-
CIATION, U.C.C. § 3-604(a) (1990) states:
A person entitled to enforce an instrument, with or without consideration,
may discharge the obligation of a party to pay the instrument (i) by an
intentional voluntary act, such as surrender of the instrument to the
party, destruction, mutilation, or cancellation of the instrument, cancella-
tion or striking out of the party's signature, or the addition of words to
the instrument indicating discharge, or (ii) by agreeing not to sue or
otherwise renouncing rights against the party by a signed writing.
(emphasis added).
95. See, e.g., Security Pac. Fin. Corp. v. Grove, 73 B.R. 590 (Bankr. Minn. 1987)
(unintentional cancellation induced by fraud); Cipra v. Seeger, 529 P.2d 130 (Kan.
1974) (circumstances at time of renewal indicated an intent to discharge the first
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termines that a spouse's accommodation is no longer necessary
for the renewal note, an agreement to discharge both the
spouse and the first note should be found in the absence of
contrary facts. If the discharge of the original note is not estab-
lished, the obligation reflected by the first note remains sus-
pended until the second note is dishonored or paid. 6 Upon dis-
honor, the creditor may enforce either the first or the second
note.97 If the first instrument is discharged, no right of recov-
ery remains on the instrument upon dishonor of the second.98
Because renewal of a note is equivalent to an extension in
time, a creditor must determine under the applicable suretyship
rule whether a renewal will discharge any accommodation party
who does not consent to the extension. Under section 3-605(c),
if the accommodation party proves that an extension in time for
payment caused loss with respect to its right of recourse, the
extension discharges the accommodation party to the extent of
the loss proven. Under former Article 3, the analysis of the
effect of an extension in time is identical to that for determin-
ing if a release discharges an accommodation party with a right
of recourse under former Article 3.99
C. Renewal and the Statute of Limitations
Finally, the effect of the renewal of the obligation on the
statute of limitations must be considered. Does the statute of
limitations for the ECOA violation on the original note "revive"
upon renewal of the obligation and issuance of a second note?
The answer should be no. Regulation B defines "credit" as a
right granted to an applicant to defer the payment of a
debt.' ° The granting of credit in any form including "refinanc-
ing or other renewal of credit"'' is an extension of credit.
Thus, the renewal of an obligation is a separate granting of
credit covered by Regulation B. Requiring a spousal signature
note); American Cement Corp. v. Century Transit Mix, Inc., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 424 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966).
96. U.C.C. § 3-310(b)(2) (1990).
97. U.C.C. § 3-310(b)(3) (1990).
98. U.C.C. § 3-604(a) (1990).
99. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
100. Reg. B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(j) (1994).
101. Id. § 202.2 (q).
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on a renewal obligation results in a second violation of ECOA
and the commencing of a new two year period on the second
violation."2 The statute of limitations for the first violation is
not revived.
D. Use of Legend on an Integrated Writing and Negotiability
Requiring a spousal's signature when the applicant meets the
creditor's reasonable standards of creditworthiness or when the
application needs the enhancing presence of a guarantor vio-
lates the Act. However, a creditor may require a spousal signa-
ture to an instrument or other documents if under the applica-
ble state law the signature is necessary or reasonably believed
by the creditor to be necessary to enable the creditor to reach
the property used as a basis for the extension of unsecured or
secured credit."3 The Official Staff Interpretations further pro-
vide that a spouse cannot be required to sign an integrated
agreement that combines a note and the security agreement but
could be asked to sign an integrated instrument that contains a
legend next to the spouse's signature which limits the effect of
the spouse's signature to the granting of a security interest in
the collateral without liability on the instrument.' Of con-
cern is whether, in a good faith attempt to comply with the
Interpretations, a creditor will destroy the negotiability of the
note by including such a legend and, thereby, negate the appli-
cability of Revised Article 3 to the obligation. 10 5
102. See Silverman v. Eastrich Multiple Investor Fund, 857 F. Supp. 447, 453
(E.D. Pa. 1994) (distinguishing a reorganization plan in bankruptcy from a creditor's
renewal in the ordinary course of business).
103. Official Staff Interpretations, 12 C.F.R. pt. 202, Supp. I § 202.7, para. 7(d)(4),
T3 (1994).
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., All Lease Co., Inc. v. Bowen, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 790
(Md. Cir. Ct. 1975) (writing containing maker's promise to insure collateral and to
obtain seller's consent to transfer of collateral not negotiable); Woodworth v. The
Richmond Indiana Venture, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1149 (Ohio Com. P1. 1990) (writ-
ing not negotiable because of provision resulting in a forfeiture of partnership interest
and payments in the event of default).
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Revised Article 3 is only applicable to written promises 0 6 or
orders 1 7 to pay that satisfy the requirements of section 3-
104(a).' Of importance, here, is the limitation imposed by
section 3-104(a) on the inclusion of any "undertaking or instruc-
tion" beyond the unconditional promise to pay a fixed sum of
money. Although Revised Article 3 authorizes the inclusion of
an undertaking to give, maintain, or protect collateral for se-
curing the payment of the note or other obligations,"°9 the sec-
tion does not expressly authorize including the granting or
creating of a security interest in collateral. However, comment
1 to section 3-104 provides that the intent of the revised article
is to maintain the same goals and meanings recognized under
former Article 3 for the exceptions on promises regarding col-
lateral. Comment 1 to section 3-112 of former Article 3 states
that cross collateral provisions, a provision securing obligations
not reflected in the note,"0 do not destroy negotiability. Such
statements do not minimize the certainty of the obligation un-
dertaken by the maker."' Consequently, the creditor's use of
106. U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(9) (1990). "Promise" means a written undertaking to pay
money signed by the person undertaking to pay. An acknowledgment of an obligation
by the obligor is not a promise unless the obligor also undertakes to pay the
obligation. Id.
107. U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(6) (1990). "Order" means a written instruction to pay money
signed by the person giving the instruction. Id.
108. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT, U.C.C. § 3-104 (1990).
(a) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d), "negotiable instru-
ment" means an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of
money, with or without interest or other charges described in the prom-
ise or order, if it:
(1) is payable to bearer or to order at the time it is issued or
first comes into possession of a holder,
(2) is payable on demand or at a definite time; and
(3) does not state any other undertaking or instruction by the
person promising or ordering payment to do any act in addition to the
payment of money, but the promise or order may contain (i) an un-
dertaking or power to give, maintain, or protect collateral to secure
payment, (ii) an authorization or power to the holder to confess judg-
ment or realize on or dispose of collateral, or (iii) a waiver of the
benefit of any law intended for the advantage or protection of an
obligor.
Id.
109. U.C.C. § 3-104 cmt. 1 (1990).
110. U.C.C. § 3-112 cmt. 1 (1989); THOMAS D. CRANDALL, ET AL., UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE § 14.10.2 (1993).
111. FREDERICK M. HART & WILLIAM F. WILLIER, COMMERCIAL PAPER § 2.10[1][b],
at 2-100 & n.9 (1995).
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an integrated agreement containing the note and the granting
of a security interest to secure the note being issued should not
destroy negotiability.
Of most importance, the restrictions of section 3-104(a) limit-
ing the kinds of promises or undertaking are only imposed on
the person promising to pay, the maker, or ordering payment,
the drawer." Undertakings otherwise prohibited by the mak-
er when made by a spouse who is not a maker of the note do
not destroy negotiability. Hence, the use of a legend limiting
the spouse's undertaking to the granting of a security interest
should not destroy negotiability.
III. CONCLUSION
The goals of the Act and its revised regulation are to promote
the availability of credit without regard to marital status and to
prohibit practices that discriminate on the basis of marital
status. To implement these goals, a guarantor's engagement
obtained in violation of the Act and Regulation B should be
subject to the defense of illegality. However, to avoid a substan-
tial forfeiture by the wrongdoing creditor, the scope of the
illegality defense should not be extended to the borrower's
engagement. Only if actual damages are sustained by the bor-
rower or punitive damages are warranted as a result of obtain-
ing the guarantor's engagement in violation of the Act should
the borrower's liability be limited or damages be otherwise
recovered. However, should a violation occur when the
borrower's engagement is obtained, suretyship law authorizes
the guarantor to employ its borrower's defenses. No exception to
this rule should be recognized in the context of an ECOA viola-
tion.
Because Revised Article 3 contains suretyship rules more
favorable to creditors' interests than those of the Restatement
of Suretyship, the common law, former Article 3, and other
112. U.C.C. § 3-104(a)(3)(1990) "does not state any other undertaking or instruction
by the person promising or ordering payment to do any act in addition to the pay-
ment of money. . . ." (emphasis added). See Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Ingel,
196 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 1964) (promise by holder to obtain insurance does not destroy
negotiability).
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state suretyship statutes, creditors may request guarantors of
credit to make their guarantees on the principal debtor's prom-
issory note rather than in a separate document. Revised Article
3 will facilitate a creditor's compliance with the Official Staff
Interpretations of Regulation B when a renewal of the
borrower's obligation is contemplated without placing the credi-
tor at risk under the revised article's suretyship principles.
Under former Article 3 and the Restatement of Suretyship, care
must be taken to comply with the preservation of rights rules
to avoid discharging any remaining surety upon renewal.
